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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization and its rise to 
prominence in the world trading system. The Appellate Body was not conceived by the 
Uruguay Round negotiators as the centerpiece of the WTO dispute settlement system. It was 
more an afterthought, linked to the introduction of the quasi-automatic adoption of panel 
reports under the new dispute settlement system. In little time, however, the Appellate Body 
grew into the most important and authoritative organ of WTO dispute settlement. The 
Appellate Body is now, in all but name, the World Trade Court. The significance of its 
                                            
1
  Professor of International Economic Law and Head of the Department of International and European 
Law, Maastricht University (p.vandenbossche@ir.unimaas.nl); and former Counsellor and Acting 
Director (1997-2001), WTO Appellate Body Secretariat, Geneva. The author thanks Sergey Ripinsky and 
Stefanie Bledoug for their able assistance. This paper is partly based on Chapter 3 on ‘WTO Dispute 
Settlement’, of P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 173-306.  
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contribution to the development of international trade law is generally recognized. Critics even 
accused the Appellate Body of having engaged in judicial legislation. This paper does not seek 
to assess whether the Appellate Body did indeed exceed its judicial mandate. The purpose of 
this paper is to recall the unassuming origins of the Appellate Body and to discuss the factors 
that have contributed to its rise to prominence over the last decade. These factors are multiple 
and often closely related. They include the first and subsequent compositions of the Appellate 
Body; the Working Procedures for Appellate Review; the early embracement and consistent 
application of the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention; the frequent and broad 
recourse to appellate review; the manner in which the Appellate Body used its authority of 
appellate review; and, finally, the case law of the Appellate Body to date, and in particular the 
case law balancing free trade and other societal values and the case law ensuring the fairness 
and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system. It is important to identify and 
correctly appreciate these factors because the Appellate Body will retain its current status and 
role in the world trading system only to the extent that these factors continue to be sufficiently 
present.  
 
Keywords: International Dispute Settlement, World Trade Organization, WTO dispute 
settlement, Appellate Body, World Trade Court  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since February 1996, when the first appeal was filed, the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization has heard and decided 65 appeals from panel cases.
2
 The body of case law 
generated by the Appellate Body over the past nine years is, both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms, impressive. From 1996 tot 2004, the Appellate Body has issued twice as many decisions 
as the International Court of Justice did during the same period.
3
 The Appellate Body’s case 
law is highly authoritative and has made a significant contribution to the development of 
international trade law. The decisions of the Appellate Body in, for example, EC – Bananas 
and US – Shrimp, have effectively put an end to politically as well as economically complex 
and sensitive disputes between WTO Members. Both panels and parties in WTO disputes have 
shown, and continue to show, much deference to the case law of the Appellate Body. The 
Appellate Body is undoubtedly the most important organ of WTO dispute settlement. The 
Appellate Body is, all but in name, the World Trade Court.
4
 In recent years, a few authors have 
accused the Appellate Body of exceeding the authority conferred to it and engaging in judicial 
                                            
2
  See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abreports.asp, visited on 6 March 2005. This number 
includes the appeal in India – Autos, which was withdrawn during the appellate review proceedings. This 
paper covers the period from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2004. 
3
  See below, section 3.4. 
4
  It was Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former member and Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body, who 
referred in a 2002 article in the Journal of World Trade to the Appellate Body as the ‘World Trade 
Court’ (see C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal 
Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 4, 605-
639. 
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legislation, especially in cases on dumping and safeguard measures.
5
 More generally, WTO 
Members, when loosing a case, allege not seldom, that the Appellate Body has added to or 
diminished the rights and obligations of Members.
6
 This paper does not seek to verify whether 
this is indeed the case.
7
 These accusations, and the ‘emotional’ terms in which they are often 
expressed, are, however, clear evidence of the importance that the Appellate Body and its case 
law now have in the WTO system. The key question addressed in this paper is what explains 
the prominent status which the Appellate Body and its case law have achieved since 1996. Was 
the ‘success’ of the Appellate Body ‘predetermined’ by its constituent instruments or is it 
primarily the result of other factors that have affected the Appellate Body and its case law in 
the past nine years? 
 
2. The Humble Origins of the Appellate Body 
 
The Understanding on the Rules and Procedures for the Resolution of Disputes, commonly 
referred to as the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU, provided in Article 17 that ‘a 
standing Appellate Body shall be established by the [WTO Dispute Settlement Body]’. 
Pursuant to this mandate, the Dispute Settlement Body, or DSB, set up the Appellate Body by 
its Decision of 10 February 1995 on the Establishment of the Appellate Body.
8
 Article 17 of 
the DSU and the DSB Decision of 10 February 1995 are the constituent instruments of the 
Appellate Body. Did the Uruguay Round negotiators, who reached agreement on the DSU and 
prepared the DSB Decision, already conceive the Appellate Body as the centerpiece of the 
WTO dispute settlement system that it is now?  
 
                                            
5
  See, e.g., J. Greenwald, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation’ (2003) 6 
Journal of International Economic Law, 113-124. 
6
  Such statements are, for example, made in the Dispute Settlement Body on the occasion of the adoption 
of the report. 
7
  This has already been done in a very convincing manner by others. See, e.g., W. Davey, ‘Has the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its Authority?’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law, 
79; and R. Howse, ‘The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and 
Limits of the Judicial Power’, in Th. Cottier and P. C. Mavroidis (eds.), The role of the judge in 
international trade regulation: experience and lessons for the WTO (University of Michigan Press, 
2003), 11. See also J. Durling, ‘Deference, but Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping 
Measures’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law, 125-147. 
8
  WT/DSB/1, dated 19 June 1995. In 1994, the Preparatory Committee for the WTO made a number of 
recommendations concerning the ‘Establishment of the Appellate Body’. It were these recommendations 
which the DSB adopted in February 1995.  
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2.1 Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute settlement 
2.1.1 GATT dispute settlement and the consensus requirement  
 
The GATT 1947 did not provide for an elaborate dispute settlement system. In fact, the GATT 
1947 contained only two brief provisions relating to dispute settlement: Articles XXII and 
XXIII. On the basis of these provisions, the GATT Contracting Parties built, in a very 
pragmatic manner over a period of decades, a fairly sophisticated and successful system for the 
resolution of trade disputes.
9
 However, the GATT dispute settlement system had some serious 
shortcomings, which became acute in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The most important 
shortcoming of the system was the fact that panel reports, to become legally binding, had to be 
adopted in the GATT Council by consensus. A Contracting Party that was found to have acted 
inconsistently with its GATT obligations, could thus block the adoption of the ‘unfavourable’ 
panel report and frustrate the operation of the dispute settlement system. Not surprisingly, the 
improvement of the GATT dispute settlement system was therefore high on the agenda of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.
10
 
 
The outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute settlement was set out in Annex 2 
of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding or DSU. The DSU provides for a new WTO dispute settlement 
system and is often referred to as one of the most important achievements of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann once described the dispute settlement system 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round as ‘an extraordinary achievement that comes close to a 
miracle’.
11
 The most significant innovation, introduced by the new dispute settlement system, 
concerns the introduction of the ‘reverse consensus’ requirement for the adoption of panel 
                                            
9
  Bob Hudec’s 1993 statistical analysis of the results of GATT dispute settlement until the end of the 
1980s indicated an overall success rate of almost 90 per cent (see R. Hudec et al., ‘A Statistical Profile of 
GATT Dispute Settlement Cases, 1948-1989’ (1993) 2 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 285-287) 
and, as Hudec noted ‘… accomplishments to this point, if not unique, are at least rare in the history of 
international legal institutions.’  (see ibid., 353). John Jackson noted: ‘… these procedures worked better 
than might have been expected, and some could argue that in fact they worked better than those of the 
World Court and many other international dispute settlement procedures. See J. Jackson, The World 
Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (Chatham House Papers, 1998), 64. 
10
  GATT Contracting Parties, Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 20 September 
1986, BISD 33S/25. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round stated with regard 
to dispute settlement: ‘In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all 
contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and the procedures of the 
dispute settlement process ...’. 
11
  C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’, Policy 
Paper RSC No 02/9, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 
44. 
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reports. For a panel report to become legally binding, it no longer has to be adopted by 
consensus; adoption by ‘reverse consensus’ suffices. A panel report is adopted by ‘reverse 
consensus’ unless there is a consensus not to adopt the report. It is clear that the latter situation 
is very unlikely to occur. Under the new WTO dispute settlement system, the adoption of panel 
reports by the Dispute Settlement Body is thus quasi-automatic. 
 
2.1.2 Reverse consensus and appellate review 
 
The introduction of the ‘reverse consensus’ requirement for the adoption of panel reports 
resolved the problem of blockage and paralysis of the dispute settlement system which had 
existed under the GATT.  However, the prospect of losing effective control over the adoption 
of panel reports made the negotiators quite apprehensive. It would no longer be possible to stop 
‘bad’ panel reports from becoming legally binding. John Jackson referred to ‘a certain 
nervousness on the part of sovereign members about the potential of this process’.
12
 During the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, the two main trading powers, the United States and the European 
Communities had both been exposed to a few panel reports which they, and others, regarded as 
‘serious legal errors’.
13
 As a safety measure against such ‘bad’ panel reports, the negotiators 
provided for an appellate review mechanism. The European Communities proposed the 
creation of an appeals mechanism for parties who believed that panel decisions are ‘erroneous 
or incomplete’.
14
 The United States supported appellate review for ‘extraordinary cases where 
a panel report contains legal interpretations that are questioned formally by one of the parties’ 
(emphasis added).
15
 Canada viewed the appellate review mechanism as a way to correct errors 
of ‘fundamentally flawed decisions’.
16
 Not all countries participating in the negotiations 
supported the introduction of appellate review. Some participants feared extra delays and 
further procedural complication in the settlement of disputes.
17
 To improve the ‘quality’ of the 
                                            
12
  J. Jackson, ‘Rule Implementation and Dispute Resolution’, in The World Trading System: Law and 
Policy of International Economic Relations (MIT Press, 1997), 125. 
13
  P.-J. Kuijper, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the European Community’ 
(1995) 29 Journal of World Trade 6, 52. The United States considered some panel reports on anti-
dumping and countervailing duties to be seriously flawed from a legal perspective. For the European 
Communities, the Panel Report in EC – Airbus was seen as a major legal error.  
14
  See 1990 Proposal by the EC; reported by T. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), 2767. 
15
  See 1990 Proposal by the US; reported by T. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), 2767-2768. 
16
  See 1990 Proposal by Canada; reported by T. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), 2768. 
17
  See Meeting of April 1990; reported by T. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), 2768. 
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panel reports, it was also proposed to introduce an ‘interim review procedure’ under which a 
panel would, following the completion of its work but prior to the adoption of the report, 
submit its interim report to the parties for their observations.
18
 This idea of an interim review 
procedure would eventually be  adopted. Article 15 of the DSU provides for such an interim 
review procedure. However, also the idea of an appellate review procedure was adopted as ‘yet 
another check on panel influence’ (emphasis added) and to ‘make the automatic adoption of 
panel reports less risky to losing parties’.
19
 Bob Hudec described the appellate review 
procedure as a ‘safety valve’ against ‘bad’ panel decisions.
20
 The introduction of appellate 
review has correctly been explained as a quid pro quo for the quasi-automatic adoption of 
panel reports.
21
 When they agreed to the establishment of a standing Appellate Body to which 
parties could appeal from panel reports, the ambitions of the participants to the negotiations 
were, however, quite modest. They certainly did not intend to create a strong international 
court at the apex of the new dispute settlement system. On the contrary, they only wanted to 
ensure that their biggest innovation, namely the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports by 
the DSB, would not have the undesirable side-effect to be without protection against an 
occasional ‘bad’ panel report. The decision to establish a standing Appellate Body to provide 
such protection was an inspired afterthought, rather than the reflection of a grand design to 
create a strong, new international court.  
  
2.2 Establishment of the Appellate Body 
 
The proposition that the decision to establish a standing Appellate Body was an afterthought, 
rather than the reflection of a grand design to create a strong, new international court, finds 
support in the relevant provisions of the DSU as well as in the Decision of February 1995 on 
the establishment of the Appellate Body. Of the 27 articles of the DSU, only one article, 
Article 17, entirely deals with the Appellate Body and the appellate review process.
22
 None of 
                                            
18
  See also E.-U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Kluwer Law International, 
1997), 186. 
19
  K. Abbott, ‘GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond’ (1992) 18 Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law, 141. 
20
  R. Hudec, ‘Dispute Settlement’, in J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round: A Results-Oriented 
Approach to the GATT Trade Negotiations (Institute for International Economics, 1990), 191. 
21
  See D. Steger, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: Revitalisation of Multilateralism after the Uruguay Round’ 
(1996) 9 Leiden Journal of International Law 2, 322, and D. Steger, ‘The Appellate Body and its 
Contribution to WTO Dispute Settlement’, in D. Kennedy and J. Southwick (eds.), The Political 
Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 483. See also J. Jackson, ‘Rule Implementation and Dispute Resolution’, in The World Trading 
System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (MIT Press, 1997), 125. 
22
  Three other articles of the DSU, Articles 16, 18 and 19, concern in part the appellate review process. 
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the four appendices of the DSU concerns the Appellate Body or its work. Compared with the 
wealth of provisions on the panel process, the paucity of provisions on appellate review is 
indicative for the importance given by the negotiators to appellate review in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
 
2.2.1 Article 17 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
 
As noted above, Article 17 of the DSU provides for the establishment of ‘a standing Appellate 
Body’.
23
 The choice of the unappealing, technical, non-descriptive term ‘Appellate Body’ as 
the name for this new institution, is telling for the aspirations of the negotiators. It is no 
coincidence that the new institution was not called the International Trade (Appeals) Court (or 
anything similar with the word ‘court’ in it). It is no coincidence either that Article 17 does not 
refer to the persons serving on the Appellate Body as ‘judges’, but merely as ‘persons’.
24
   
 
Article 17 first defines the task of the Appellate Body in very general terms as hearing appeals 
from panel cases,
25
 but then goes on to narrow considerably the scope of appellate review and 
the mandate of the Appellate Body. Appeals are limited to issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations adopted by the panel.
26
 Generally speaking, the panel’s findings 
on factual issues thus escape from appellate review.
27
 The Appellate Body must address each 
of the legal issues raised during the appellate review proceeding
28
 but its mandate is – 
according to Article 17.13 of the DSU – ultimately limited to upholding, modifying or 
reversing the panel’s legal findings and conclusions.
29
 The possibility of remanding a case to 
the panel is not provided for.
30
 Access to appellate review is also limited. Only parties to the 
dispute can appeal a panel report; third parties or other WTO Members cannot appeal a panel 
report, even if their interests are clearly at stake. Members other than the parties can be heard 
by the Appellate Body but only if these Members have notified the DSB of a substantial 
interest in the dispute at the very outset of the panel process.
31
 
  
                                            
23
  See Article 17.1 of the DSU. 
24
  See Articles 17.1, 17.2 and 17.3 of the DSU. 
25
  Ibid. 
26
  See Article 17.6 of the DSU. 
27
  See below, section 3.5. 
28
  See Article 17.12 of the DSU. 
29
  See below, section 3.5 
30
  Ibid. 
31
  See Article 17.4 of the DSU. 
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According to Article 17.6 of the DSU, the Appellate Body shall be composed of seven persons. 
Compared with international courts, such as the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(‘ITLoS’), which comprise 15, 18 and 21 judges respectively, the small size of the WTO 
Appellate Body is striking.
32
 Moreover, Article 17.2 provides that appeals are never heard by 
the Appellate Body en banc, but always by only three of the seven persons serving on the 
Appellate Body. It is clear that the authority of rulings by the full Appellate Body would have 
been greater than the authority of rulings by three persons, a number which does not exceed the 
number of panelists who ‘produced’ the panel report under review.
33
 More importantly, the fact 
that only three of the seven Members would sit on each appeal created a significant danger to 
the consistency and coherence of the case law of the Appellate Body. 
 
As to the qualifications required of persons serving on the Appellate Body, Article 17.3 of the 
DSU reflects rather limited expectations. Persons serving on the Appellate Body must be 
‘persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and 
the subject matter of the covered agreements’. In comparison, the Statute of the ICJ requires 
that judges of the ICJ are ‘persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications 
required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are 
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.’ (emphasis added)
34
 Judges of the 
ICC must be ‘persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the 
qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices’.
35
 Judges on the ITLoS must be ‘persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness 
and integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea’.
36
 The 
qualifications required of persons serving on the Appellate Body, as set out in Article 17.3, are 
hardly more demanding than the qualifications required of persons serving on panels.
37
 A 
significant difference, however, is that persons serving on the Appellate Body must be 
                                            
32
  See Article 3 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm, visited on 29 December 2004;  
Article 36 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf, visited 28 December 2004; and 
Article 2 (1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, visited on 29 December 2004. 
33
  Note that theoretically it is even possible that a panel comprises five panelists. See Article 8.5 of the 
DSU. 
34
  Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm, visited on 29 December 2004. 
35
  Article 36 (3)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf, visited 29 December 2004. 
36
  Article 2 (1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, visited on 29 December 2004. 
37
  See Article 8.1 of the DSU, which states that panels shall be composed of ‘well-qualified … individuals’. 
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unaffiliated with any government while many panelists will be government officials and 
diplomats of Members not involved in the dispute.
38
  
 
As the judges of the ICJ, ICC and the ITLoS, the persons serving on the Appellate Body are 
appointed by a political body. In the case of the Appellate Body, this is the DSB.
39
 Unlike the 
other political bodies appointing the ICJ, ICC and ITLoS judges, however, the DSB must take 
the decisions on appointment by consensus, which means that any WTO Member can veto the 
appointment of a particular person to the Appellate Body.
40
 
 
Persons serving on the Appellate Body are appointed for a term of four years, renewable only 
once. Judges of the ICJ, ICC and the ITLoS are appointed for a term of 9 years, after which 
they can – at least in the case of the ICJ and ITLoS – be re-appointed.
41
 A term of four years is 
remarkably short and cannot but reflect the aspiration of Members to keep a certain degree of 
control over the persons serving on the Appellate Body. 
 
The composition of the Appellate Body shall be broadly representative of membership in the 
WTO. The ICJ, the ICC and the ITLoS have similar, but more explicit requirements to 
guarantee the ‘representative nature’ of the court.  In the ICJ, the ICC and the ITLoS ‘the 
principal legal systems of the world’ must be represented.
42
 No such requirement is explicitly 
stated with regard to the composition of the Appellate Body. 
 
                                            
38
  See Articles 8.1 and 17.3 of the DSU. 
39
  See Article 17.2 of the DSU. For the ICJ, this is the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. For 
the ICC, this is the Assembly of States Parties. For the ITLoS, this is the meeting of the States Parties. 
40
  Article 1.4 of the DSU states that: ‘Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the 
DSU to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus.’ Footnote 1 to this provision states: ‘The DSB shall 
be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, 
present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.’ 
41
  See Article 13 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm, visited on 29 December 2004;  
Article 36 (9) (a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf, visited 28 December 2004; and 
Article 5 (1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, visited on 29 December 2004. 
42
  See Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm, visited on 29 December 2004;  
Article 36 (8) (a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf, visited 28 December 2004; and 
Article 2 (2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, visited on 29 December 2004. 
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Article 17 requires of the persons serving on the Appellate Body that they are available at all 
times and on short notice and stay abreast of developments in WTO law and policy.
43
 No 
similar provision is found in the Statutes of the ICJ, the ICC and the ITLoS as it is undoubtedly 
considered to be self-evident that the judges on these courts are ‘available’ for work and 
remain well-informed. The negotiators of the DSU, however, did not view membership of the 
Appellate Body as a full-time activity and, therefore, considered it useful to ‘ensure’ the 
availability of persons serving on the Appellate Body to hear and decide appeals. 
 
The Appellate Body also distinguishes itself from international courts such as the ICJ, the ICC 
and the ITLoS with regard to the timeframe for the proceedings. According to Article 17.5 of 
the DSU, the proceedings of the Appellate Body ‘shall in no case exceed 90 days’.
44
 This 
period of maximum 90 days starts with the filing of the notice of appeal and includes also the 
time needed for parties to file their written submissions, to hold an oral hearing, to deliberate, 
to draft the report and to translate the report. No international court works under similar time 
constraints. For proceedings of the ICJ, the ICC and the ITLoS, such time constraints would 
undoubtedly be considered ‘unreasonable’ on the parties as well as the court, and likely to 
endanger proper consideration of the issues in the dispute. The negotiators of the DSU 
apparently did not have such concerns.  
 
Article 17 of the DSU provides that the proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be 
confidential.
45
  This blanket requirement of ‘secrecy’ is clearly a legacy from the days trade 
disputes were resolved through diplomacy rather than adjudication. Confidentiality of this 
nature is alien to international court proceedings. The proceedings of the ICJ, the ICC and the 
ITLoS are public, unless the court has reason to decide otherwise. 
 
Finally, Appellate Body reports must be adopted by the DSB;
46
 they are not legally binding on 
the parties to the dispute without such adoption. Although the DSB adopts Appellate Body 
reports by reverse consensus, and the adoption is thus quasi-automatic, this adoption is still a 
formal requirement. The legal power of decisions of international courts is never subject to the 
approval by a political body. 
   
                                            
43
  See Article 17.3 of the DSU. 
44
  Note that as a general rule Appellate Body proceedings shall not exceed 60 days. However, if the 
Appellate Body considers it impossible to provide its report within 60 days, it can take up to 90 days. 
45
  Article 18.2 of the DSU makes clear that this requirement of confidentiality also concerns all written 
submissions to the Appellate Body. 
46
  Article 17.14 of the DSU. 
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2.2.2 Decision on the Establishment of the Appellate Body of 10 February 1995 
 
As noted above, Article 17.1 of the DSU left it to the DSB to establish the Appellate Body.
47
 
The DSB did so at its very first meeting on 10 February 1995.
48
 The DSB in fact adopted the 
relevant 1994 recommendations by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO. In addition to 
formally establishing the Appellate Body, the Decision of the DSB of 10 February 1995, also 
clarified a number of issues relating to the composition of the Appellate Body, the conditions of 
employment of Appellate Body Members, conflict of interest guidelines for Appellate Body 
Members and supporting staff, and the administrative and other support to be given to the 
Appellate Body. While the Decision of 10 February 1995 explicitly stated that ‘the success of 
the WTO will depend greatly on the proper composition of the Appellate Body, and persons of 
the highest calibre should serve on it’, the Decision barely clarifies the required qualifications set 
out in Article 17.3 of the DSU. The Decision merely stated that the qualifications should be of a 
type that allows Appellate Body Members to resolve ‘issues of law covered in the panel report 
and legal interpretations developed by the panel’.
49
 The Decision did, however, clarify that to 
ensure that the membership of the Appellate Body is broadly representative of membership in the 
WTO, factors such as different geographical areas, levels of development, and legal systems 
must be duly taken into account.
50
 The Decision also made clear that the requirement that 
Appellate Body Members not be ‘affiliated with any government’ should be applied with 
common sense
51
 and emphasized that the scope of the requirement that Appellate Body Members 
not participate in the consideration of disputes that would create a conflict of interest, should be 
clarified through the elaboration of high standards of conduct.
52
  The most revealing part of the 
Decision on the Establishment of the Appellate Body concerns the conditions of employment of 
the Members of the Appellate Body. While the DSB explicitly stated that ‘the contractual basis 
of members of the Appellate Body should reflect the overriding concern that candidates are of a 
high enough calibre’, it decided to appoint the Members on a part-time basis. The DSB did not 
see a contradiction in this. On the contrary, it argued that a part-time contractual arrangement, 
                                            
47
  Note that Article 17.1 did not give any indication as to the timeframe within which this establishment 
was to occur. However, this has not been a problem. 
48
  Dispute Settlement Body, Establishment of the Appellate Body, Decision adopted on 10 February 1995, 
WT/DSB/1, dated 19 June 1995. 
49
  Ibid., para. 5. 
50
  Ibid., para. 6. 
51
  Ibid., para. 7. According to the DSB, this requirement prohibits only attachments to a government that 
would compromise the independence of judgment. However, this requirement would not necessarily rule 
out persons who, although paid by a government, serve in a function rigorously and demonstrably 
independent from that government. 
52
  Ibid., para. 8. According to the DSB, Members of the Appellate Body would adhere to such standards 
and, in a particular case, disclose any relevant financial, business and professional interests.  
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with a monthly retainer plus a fee for actual days worked,
53
 could lead to a wider range of 
candidates being available, since Members could continue to pursue other activities in their 
country of origin.
54
  In February 1995, Members were still convinced that the Appellate Body 
would not be busy enough to warrant full-time employment.  The Decision of 10 February 1995 
referred to the need for Appellate Body Members to undertake ‘sporadic trips to Geneva’ 
(emphasis added).
55
 It is clear that not all Members were satisfied with the part-time contractual 
arrangement for Appellate Body Members. Note that the Decision of 10 February 1995 stated 
that the contractual arrangement could be kept under review by the DSB, and considered at the 
latest at the first Ministerial Conference to determine whether a move to full-time employment 
was warranted.
56
 
 
From the above analysis of the relevant provisions of the DSU and the Decision of the DSB of 
10 February 1995, it follows that the decision to establish a standing Appellate Body was 
certainly not the reflection of a grand design to create a strong, authoritative court that would 
be at the epicenter of the new WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
 
3. The Road to Prominence 
 
While the Uruguay Round negotiators had limited ambitions when providing for a standing 
Appellate Body, the Appellate Body is now the centerpiece of the WTO dispute settlement 
system and, all but in name, the World Trade Court.
57
 Several factors have contributed to this 
rise to prominence. These factors include: the first and subsequent compositions of the 
Appellate Body; the Working Procedures for Appellate Review; the early embracement and 
consistent application of the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention; the frequent and 
broad recourse to appellate review; the manner in which the Appellate Body used its authority 
                                            
53
  Ibid., paras. 11 and 12. The monthly retainer was set at a minimum of SF 7,000 per month while with 
regard to the daily fee (as well as travel expenses and a per diem), it was agreed that this fee would be set 
on the basis of further research on current rates for equivalent services under similar conditions. 
54
  Ibid., para. 11. 
55
  Ibid , para. 12. 
56
  Ibid., para. 11. 
57
  Bob Hudec noted already in 1999, ‘whether intended or not, … the decision to create an Appellate Body 
has … caused a pronounced shift in the center of power in the GATT/WTO legal machinery. In the 
previous GATT panel proceedings, the decisive influence had generally rested with the legal analysis 
performed by the GATT Secretariat’s Office of Legal Affairs. Under the present GATT/WTO procedure, 
the Appellate Body now has the final word on all issues of law.’ See R. Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years’ (1999) 8 Minnesota Journal of Global 
Trade 1, 27. 
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of appellate review; and, finally, the case law of the Appellate Body to date, and in particular 
the case law balancing free trade and other societal values and interests and the case law 
ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
3.1 Composition of the Appellate Body 
 
A first important factor contributing to the rise to prominence of the Appellate Body has been 
its first and subsequent compositions. Whether intentionally or not, the DSB appointed the 
‘right’ persons to serve on the Appellate Body. While Article 17.3 of the DSU requires 
Members of the Appellate Body to have ‘demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and 
the subject matter of the covered agreements generally’ (emphasis added), few of the seven 
Members appointed in November 1995 met this requirement. With the exception of 
Ambassador Julio Lacarte-Muró, none of the Members then appointed were renowned 
international trade law experts. Four of the seven Members had in fact no expertise in the field 
of GATT law at all.  Apart from Lacarte, no Member had ever served as a panelist on a GATT 
panel.
58
  The extensive expertise of the Appellate Body Members appointed in November 1995 
was in international law in general, in European Community law, in competition law, in 
commercial law, in (development) economics, and in national and international dispute 
resolution and adjudication.
59
 The breadth as well as the depth of this non-GATT expertise of 
the Members appointed in November 1995 had an important impact on the early case law of 
the Appellate Body. As most Members were not familiar with GATT practice and had not been 
involved in the Uruguay Round negotiations, they were not ‘burdened’ with preconceived 
ideas on WTO law. This made it easier for them, than it would have been for GATT veterans, 
to inject new ideas and approaches in the interpretation and application of WTO law. It is not 
surprising that an Appellate Body of this composition saw cause to state already in its very first 
case that the GATT 1994 ‘is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.’
60
 
                                            
58
  Prior to his appointment to the Appellate Body, Ambassador Julio Lacarte-Muró had served on 4 GATT 
panels, including the 1962 Panel in United Kingdom Waivers, Application in Respect of Customs Duties 
on Bananas. 
59
  For a moving and very personal description of the personalities and backgrounds of these first Appellate 
Body Members, see J. Bacchus, Trade and Freedom (Cameron May, 2004), 53-106. As Debra Steger 
noted, ‘[a]ll seven original Appellate Body Members had legal training, although not all of them had 
practiced law. Four of them had previous careers as senior bureaucrats or diplomats with a strong legal 
dimension to their work; one had been a professor of law; one had been a judge of the Supreme Court of 
his country; and one had been a lawyer and a politician.’ See D. Steger, ‘The Appellate Body and its 
contribution to WTO Dispute Settlement’, in D. Kennedy and J. Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy 
of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
485. 
60
  Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 16. 
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With the exception of Ambassador Lacarte (who had already been involved in GATT matters 
in the late 1940s), the Members of the Appellate Body were, and remained, outsiders in 
Geneva. All Members deliberately kept a low profile and, wisely, never engaged in a public 
debate on their rulings. They did not seek publicity. They would seldom, if ever, be seen at 
official diplomatic functions, partly because they did not permanently reside in Geneva, partly 
because they deliberately chose to keep their distance. This ‘aloofness’ created a certain aura of 
mystic and charisma which served the Appellate Body well in establishing itself as the 
supreme organ of WTO dispute settlement.   
 
The DSB did not only appoint in November 1995 Members lacking expertise in GATT law, it 
also appointed mainly Members that had already retired and had few, if any, other professional 
activities or obligations. Ambassador Lacarte was 77 and Dr. El-Naggar 75 years old at the 
time of their appointment to the Appellate Body. Whether the DSB intentionally appointed 
persons with this profile is unclear but it definitely ensured a high degree of availability for the 
work on hand. Moreover, most, if not all, Members appointed in November 1995 also shared a 
nearly missionary belief in the importance of the task entrusted to them. Curtis Reitz wrote in 
1996 that ‘the initial appointees to the WTO Appellate Body have an especially heavy 
responsibility to give that important body and its decisions stature and credibility’.
61
 The first 
seven Appellate Body Members were acutely aware of this responsibility. 
 
Finally, the DSB succeeded in appointing an Appellate Body, the membership of which was 
indeed broadly representative of membership in the WTO. Among the first seven Appellate 
Body Members, all continents were represented, and four of them came from developed 
country Members (including the European Communities and the United States) and three from 
developing country Members. Such degree of representativeness did contribute to the 
legitimacy and acceptability of the Appellate Body. 
 
None of the ‘original’ seven Members of the Appellate Body still serves on the Appellate 
Body. New appointments to the Appellate Body took place in 1999, 2001 and 2003. While the 
average age of Appellate Body Members is now somewhat lower and more of them are 
(former) professors of law, the DSB has continued to appoint Members with no or little prior 
expertise in GATT or WTO law. Note that of the Members appointed since November 1995, 
                                            
61
  C. Reitz, ‘Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (1996) 17 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 600. 
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only A.V. Ganesan and M. Janow had experience as a panelist prior to their appointment to the 
Appellate Body.
62
 It is, however, the breadth and depth of the non-WTO expertise of its 
Members that has served the Appellate Body well.  
 
3.2 Working Procedures for Appellate Review 
 
A second important factor in the rise to prominence of the Appellate Body has been the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review adopted by the Appellate Body in February 1996. The first task 
of the Members of the Appellate Body after their appointment in November 1995 was to draw up 
detailed working procedures. In their Working Procedures, the Members made fundamental 
choices with regard to the nature and the conduct of appellate review proceedings. The two main 
characteristics of the proceedings are their judicial nature and the importance given to 
collegiality. 
 
As discussed above, Article 17.1 of the DSU provides that appeals are not heard and decided by 
the Appellate Body en banc but by a division of three Members serving in rotation. This ‘rotating 
pattern of decision-making’ provided for by DSU negotiators, might well have created a 
significant obstacle to the development of a consistent body of case law.
63
 However, the 
Appellate Body recognized and addressed this danger in its Working Procedures. Rule 4 of the 
Working Procedures, entitled ‘Collegiality’, requires of the division responsible for deciding an 
appeal ‘to exchange views with the other Members before the division finalizes the appellate 
report’.
64
 This mechanism of ‘exchange of views’ – quite unique in national and international 
dispute settlement – has been of ‘enormous benefit to the work of the Appellate Body’.
65
 While 
the responsibility for deciding the appeal remains with the division, the exchange of views 
                                            
62
  A.V. Ganesan served in 2000 as a panelist in US – Copyright, and Merit Janow served in 2002 in EC – 
Sardines. 
63
  R. Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years’ (1999) 8 
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 28.  See also K. Joergens, ‘True Appellate Procedure or Only a 
Two Stage Process? A Comparative View of the Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’ (1999) 30 Law and Policy in International Business, 217-218. 
64
  Rule 4.3 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
65
  C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’, Policy 
Paper RSC No 02/9, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 
12. Note that some authors have stated that this process of the Appellate Body, whereby the members of 
a division decide after having consulted all the members of the Appellate Body ‘appears inconsistent 
with principles of due process in common law systems where only those who have heard a case can be 
involved in decision-making. See D. McRae, ‘What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?’ (2004) 7 
Journal of International Economic Law, 3. 
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actively involves the full Appellate Body in every single appeal.
66
 This has allowed the 
Appellate Body to ensure consistency and coherence in its case law. It has also allowed to 
Appellate Body to draw on the individual and collective expertise of all seven Members.
67
 The 
mechanism of ‘exchange of views’ has thus significantly contributed to the quality and 
authority of the decisions of the Appellate Body. After retiring from the Appellate Body, 
several of its former Members publicly paid tribute to the high degree of collegiality among the 
Members of the Appellate Body and the positive effect thereof on its case law.
68
   
 
The Working Procedures for Appellate Review, as adopted by the Appellate Body in February 
1996, also provide for judicial-type proceedings and a court-like appeals body. The Appellate 
Body made it clear as from the outset that it expected a ‘fairly high standard of practice’, as 
compared with the ‘more easy-going standard of practice common to party-controlled panel 
proceedings.’
69
 Part I of the Working Procedures sets out the duties and responsibilities of the 
Appellate Body Members and put much emphasis on their independence and impartiality, as 
well as on the avoidance of conflicts of interest.
70
 The Appellate Body adopted on a 
provisional basis the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes and attached these Rules in Annex II to the Working 
Procedures. Almost a year later, in December 1996, the DSB approved these Rules of Conduct 
and made them applicable to all stages of WTO dispute settlement.
71
  The Rules of Conduct, as 
they apply to Appellate Body Members and the Appellate Body Secretariat, are more elaborated 
than those of established international courts, such as the ICJ.  Part I of the Working Procedures 
also set out the rules on the composition and operation of divisions.
72
  Members constituting a 
division shall be selected on the basis of rotation, while taking into account the principles of 
random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve regardless of their 
national origin. It is remarkable that in the selection of the Members constituting a division, the 
nationality of the Members is of no importance.
73
 In international courts such as the ICJ, the ICC 
                                            
66
  The four Members not serving on the division receive all written submissions of the participants and 
third participants in the appeal and can (and will) consult the verbatim typescript made of the oral 
hearing.  
67
  This was also the dual objective of the exchange of views set out in Rule 4.1 of the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review. 
68
  See C.-D. Ehlermann, op.cit., 27; and J. Bacchus, op.cit. 35-49.  
69
  R. Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years’ (1999) 
8 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 28. 
70
  Rules 2, 14 and 15 and Rules 8 to 11 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
71
  WT/DSB/RC/1, dated 11 December 1996 
72
  Rules 3, 6, 7, 12 and 13 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
73
  This is even more remarkable given the fact that the divisions hearing and deciding the appeals consist of 
only 3 Members. However it must be noted that a result of the small size of the Appellate Body and the fact 
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and the ITLoS, the nationality of the judges is still taken into account. In the ICJ, for example, if 
one of the parties has a national on the Court, the other party is entitled to an ad hoc judge to be 
added to the Court to hear and decide the case.
74
 While Appellate Body divisions often 
comprised Members with the nationality of the appellant or appellee and in some appeals such a 
Member even presided the division,
75
 there has been no criticism of national bias. 
 
Part II of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review describes, in great detail and with 
particular concern for due process, the appellate review process. It provides for specific rules on 
the commencement of an appeal, on the working schedule of an appeal, on the appellant’s and 
appellee’s submissions, on the rights of third participants, on the oral hearing, on the filing and 
circulation of documents, on the prohibition of ex parte communications, on multiple appeals, on 
the transmittal of the record to the Appellate Body, on additional memoranda, on the 
consequences of failure to appear and on the withdrawal of an appeal. Annex I of the Working 
Procedures contains a detailed time table for appeals. To fit in the overall timeframe of 
maximum 90 days mandated by Article 17.5 of the DSU, this working schedule is dreadfully 
tight, with very short time periods in which the participants in the appeal must file their written 
submissions and in which the division of the Appellate Body hearing the appeal must conduct 
the oral hearing, deliberate, exchange views, deliberate again, draft, translate and finally circulate 
the report. The Working Procedures for Appellate Review leave no doubt that the Appellate 
Body division hearing the appeal (and not the participants) is firmly in control of the appellate 
process, just as one would except from a court as opposed to an arbitral body.  At the request of 
the participants, the division could deviate from the time periods set out in the Working 
Procedures but it will only do so – and has only done so – in exceptional circumstances, where 
strict adherence to a time period set out in the Working Procedures would result in a manifest 
unfairness. Where in an appeal a procedural question arises that is not covered by the Working 
Procedures, the Appellate Body division hearing that appeal has the authority to adopt an 
additional procedural rule for the purposes of that appeal. The Working Procedures give this 
authority to the division ‘in the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of an 
appeal’. The Appellate Body division in EC – Asbestos used this authority to adopt an Additional 
Procedure to deal with the many amicus curiae briefs submitted to the division in that appeal.
76
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
that the United States and the European Communities are involved in many appeals, excluding nationals 
from the participants to sit on the divisions may never have been a real option. 
74
  See Article 31 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
75
  See, for example, the Appellate Body Division in EC – Bananas. This division was chaired by James 
Bacchus while the United States was an appellee in this case. 
76
  Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 50 – 57. 
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The Working Procedure adopted in February 1996 have served the Appellate Body very well 
and have allowed it to conduct its work in a fair, efficient and genuinely judicial manner. The 
Working Procedures were amended in 1997, 2002, 2003 and 2005. With each of these 
amendments specific deficiencies of the Working Procedures were remedied. This was in 
particular the case with the amendments effective as of 2002, which made it easier for third 
parties to participate in the oral hearing, and the amendments effective as of 2005, which 
elaborated on the content requirements for the notice of appeal, introduced the requirement of 
notice of other appeal to be filed by other appellants, modified the timing of the oral hearing.
77
   
These and other amendments further strengthened the court-like nature of the Appellate Body 
and the judicial-type nature of the appellate review proceedings. 
 
3.3 Embracing the Vienna Convention rules of treaty interpretation 
 
A third important factor in the rise to prominence of the Appellate Body has been the early 
embracement and consistent application of the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. Article 3.2 of the DSU stipulates in relevant part that the dispute 
settlement system serves ‘to clarify the existing provisions of [the covered] agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.’ (emphasis 
added) Already in its very first report, the report in US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body ruled 
that the ‘general rule of interpretation’ set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties forms part of the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ 
which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply.’
78
 In its 
second report, the report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body added that 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with the role of supplementary means of 
interpretation, has also attained the same status of a customary rule of interpretation and must 
                                            
77
  See Working Procedures for Appellate Review, circulated 15 February 1996, WT/AB/WP/1; Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review, circulated 28 February 1997, WT/AB/WP/2; Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review, circulated 24 January 2002, WT/AB/WP/3; Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review, circulated 1 May 2003, WT/AB/WP/4; and Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 
circulated 4 January 2005, WT/AB/WP/5. Note that a 2004 proposal for a different calculation of the 
time limits in appellate proceedings, allowing to take account of holiday periods (Christmas/New Year 
and August) was dropped by the Appellate Body in the light of reactions from WTO Members. While the 
Appellate Body has the authority to amend its Working Procedures after consulting the Chairperson of 
the DSB and WTO Director General, the Appellate Body has apparently become reluctant to adopt 
amendments to its Working Procedures without the support of the WTO Membership. The Appellate 
Body stated that it dropped its amendment on the calculation of the time limits in order to allow 
Members an opportunity, themselves, to decide how to deal with this issue. However, the Appellate Body 
stressed that this decision to drop this proposal is without prejudice to its right to revisit this issue at a 
later date. See WT/AB/WP/W/9, dated 7 October 2004, 7. 
78
  Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 16. 
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therefore be applied by the Appellate Body.
79
 From the very beginning, the Appellate Body has 
left no room for doubt regarding the basic rules of interpretation it would apply. As Article 
31.1 of the Vienna Convention requires, the Appellate Body has consistently interpreted 
provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words of 
the provision taken in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the agreement 
involved. It has been observed that of the three elements referred to in Article 31.1 – text, 
context and object-and-purpose – the Appellate Body has attached the greatest weight to the 
first element, the text or ordinary meaning of the of words of the provision to be interpreted. 
This is illustrated by the frequent references in Appellate Body reports to, for example, the 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary, ‘which, in the words of certain critical observers, has become “one 
of the covered agreements”.’
80
 As the Appellate Body ruled in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation 
for the interpretive process; interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty.
81
 
The Panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act correctly noted, however, that the elements of Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention – text, context, object-and-purpose – constitute ‘one holistic rule 
of interpretation’, and not ‘a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order’.
82
 
To determine the ordinary meaning of a term, it makes sense to start with the dictionary 
meaning of that term but, as the Appellate Body noted more than once, a term often has several 
dictionary meanings and dictionary meanings thus leave many interpretative questions open.
83
 
The ordinary meaning of a term cannot be determined outside the context in which the term is 
used and without consideration of the object and purpose of the agreement at issue. 
 
An important corollary of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention already identified by the Appellate Body in its second report, the report in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II, is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a 
treaty (i.e., the interpretative principle of effectiveness). An interpreter is not free to adopt a 
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or 
inutility.
84
 Furthermore, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones cautioned interpreters that ‘the 
fundamental rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret the 
                                            
79
  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.104. 
80
  As reported by C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the 
WTO’, Policy Papers RSC No 02/9, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, 16. 
81  
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 105-106.  
82
  Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.22. 
83
  See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 153; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, 
para. 92. 
84
  See Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, DSR 1996:I, 21. 
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words actually used by the agreement under examination, not words the interpreter may feel 
should have been used.’
85
 In India – Patents (US), the Appellate Body ruled that the principles 
of treaty interpretation ‘neither require nor condone’ the importation into a treaty of ‘words 
that are not there’ or ‘concepts that were not intended’.
86
 
 
Bob Hudec once noted that the care and attention given to the Vienna Convention could be 
viewed as ‘bit excessive’, given the rather open-ended drafting the Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention and the differences among scholars as to what they mean.
87
 Hudec 
immediately added, however, that in defence of the Appellate Body, it must be remembered 
that ‘the WTO dispute settlement procedure is facing a difficult task of obtaining government 
compliance with its new and more demanding rules’ and that ‘in this situation, a normal 
measure of prudence would dictate giving legal rules the greatest possible appearance of 
objective legal authority’.
88
 According to Hudec, claiming that a specific interpretation of a 
rule is called for by the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation is ‘the first thing any rational 
tribunal would do in these circumstances.’
89
 
 
In its efforts to clarify provisions of the covered agreements, the Appellate Body has from the 
outset given primary importance to the ordinary meaning of the wording actually used in the 
provisions to be interpreted.  It is beyond doubt that the results of this interpretative approach 
are more easily accepted by the parties to the agreement than the often surprising results of 
interpretative approaches that give relatively less importance to the text, but more to the 
context and the object and purpose of the agreement. By choosing for, and then consistently 
applying, a ‘text first’ approach to interpretation, the Appellate Body has given itself credibility 
and reliability in the eyes of WTO Members. As Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, one of the original 
seven Appellate Body Members, wrote in 2002: ‘… the interpretative method, established and 
clearly announced by the Appellate Body, has had a legitimising effect, and this from the very 
beginning of its activities’.
90
 An interpretative approach based on ‘legitimate expectations’ of 
one of the parties to the dispute – an approach adopted by the Panel in EC – Computer 
                                            
85
  Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 181. 
86
  Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US), para. 45. 
87
  See R. Hudec, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the Three First Years’ 
(1999) 8 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 29-30. 
88
  Ibid. 
89
  Ibid. 
90
  C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO’, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Policy Papers, RSC No. 02/9, 16. 
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Equipment but on appeal explicitly rejected by the Appellate Body – would definitely not  have 
had this ‘legitimising effect’ referred to by Ehlermann. 
 
While the Appellate Body has consistently followed the Vienna Convention rules of 
interpretation, this does not mean that it never strayed from its chosen method of interpretation. 
There are undoubtedly a number of instances in which the interpretation given by the Appellate 
Body to a specific term or provision does not seem to be the obvious result of a textual 
approach to interpretation. Two examples that come to mind are the interpretations of the term 
‘seek’ (interpreted to mean ‘receive’) and the term ‘should’ (interpreted to mean ‘shall’), both 
terms in Article 13 of the DSU and interpreted in US – Shrimp and Canada – Aircraft 
respectively.
91
 Note, however, that in these and other instances the Appellate Body did make a 
valiant attempt to argue that the interpretative result reached was based on the text in its 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of the relevant agreement. Quite to the point, 
Konstantin Joergens once noted that while ‘[t]he case law reveals that the Appellate Body has 
sometimes failed to achieve the desired degree of consistency in its analysis’, ‘in the light of 
the complex nature of the WTO Agreement, one has to concede that it is also difficult for the 
Appellate Body to produce consistent legal conclusions all of the time.’
92
 I add that, as the 
Appellate Body stated already in its second report, the report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
II, WTO rules are to be interpreted having in mind that they ‘are not so rigid or so inflexible as 
not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb 
and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world.’
93
 
 
 3.4 Frequent and broad recourse to appellate review  
 
The Appellate Body would not have gained the prominence it has today if parties to disputes 
had not made such frequent use of the possibility to appeal panel reports and if recourse to, or 
involvement in, appellate review had been limited to a few WTO Members only. Likewise, the 
Appellate Body would not have gained its current prominence if only a few WTO agreements 
would have been the subject of appellate review. A fourth important factor in the rise to 
prominence has therefore been the high number of appeals, the relatively high percentage of 
                                            
91
  Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 104-110; and Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, 
para. 187. 
92
  K. Joergens, ‘True Appellate Procedure or Only a Two Stage Process? A Comparative View of the 
Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’ (1999) 30 Law and Policy in 
International Business, 219. 
93
  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 122-123. 
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the WTO Membership that has been involved in appellate review proceedings to date and the 
broad substantive scope of appeals. 
 
The first appeal was filed on 21 February 1996 by the United States in US – Gasoline. Between 
1996 and 2004, a total of 67 notices of appeal were filed.
94
 When compared with the number of 
cases brought to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea in this same period, respectively 37 and 13 cases,
95
 the true significance of the number 
of appeals cases brought to the Appellate Body becomes clear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After gradually increasing between 1996 and 1999, the number of appeals peaked in 2000 with 
13 appeals and has steadily declined since. With only 5 appeals, the number of appeals reached 
in 2004 its lowest level since 1996.
96
 The trend of the number of appeals per year follows the 
trend of the number of panel reports quite closely. When the number of panel reports goes up 
or down, the number of appeals does likewise (although obviously with some delay). From the 
                                            
94
  See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/noticecount.asp, visited on 3 January 2005. The total 
number of 67 notices of appeals includes the two notices of appeal filed by the European Communities in 
EC – Hormones, complaints by the US and Canada, and by the United States in U.S. - 1916 Act, 
complaints by the EC and Japan. In each of these disputes, the panel circulated two separate reports and 
the appellants therefore filed two notices of appeal. Note, however, that in U.S. - Steel Safeguards, the 
United States filed only one notice of appeal against eight separate panel reports (be it that these reports 
were contained in one single document). The total number of 67 notices of appeal does not include the 
notices of appeal that were withdrawn and later re-filed, as was the case in U.S. - FSC, U.S. - Line Pipe 
Safeguards, EC - Sardines and U.S. - Lumber CVDs Final.  
95
  For the International Court of Justice, see http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm, visited on 1 
April 2005. For the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, see http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, 
visited on 1 April 2005. 
96
  See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/appealcount.asp, visited on 7 January 2005. The two 
Panel Reports in EC – Scallops and the Panel Reports in EC - Butter and U.S. - DRAMS, Article 21.5 are 
not included as these reports simply reported that a mutually agreed solution was reached.  The Panel 
Report in EC - Bananas, Article 21.5 relating to the request made by the European Communities, is 
included as a non-appealed panel report, even though it was never placed on the agenda of a DSB 
meeting for adoption. The Panel Report in India – Autos, is counted as a panel report that was appealed, 
even though the appeal was later withdrawn. 
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data on the evolution of the number of appeals in the period 2001-2004, one cannot, therefore, 
conclude that it has become less ‘popular’ to appeal panel reports. On the contrary, the rate of 
appeal, i.e., the number of panel reports that is appealed, has gone up in recent years.
97
 Of all 
the panel reports circulated in the period from 1996 to 2004, 70 per cent has been appealed. 
This is undoubtedly a much higher percentage than the Uruguay Round negotiators had ever 
expected. As discussed above, to the Uruguay Round negotiators, appellate review was to be a 
rather exceptional process to weed out particularly ‘bad’ panel reports.
98
 Instead, during the 
first two years, the rate of appeal was 100 per cent as all panel reports circulated were 
appealed.
99
 The first panel report not appealed was the report in Japan – Film, circulated on 31 
March 1998. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is wrong to conclude from the high rate of appeal that most panel reports are of poor quality. 
The high rate of appeal is primarily due to the fact that, in most cases, a respondent whose 
legislation or trade measures were found to be WTO-inconsistent by the panel,
100
 has very little 
to loose by appealing the findings of inconsistency. Even if the Appellate Body upholds the 
                                            
97
  The rate of appeal fell to a low of 58 per cent in 2002 but was back at 67 per cent in 2004. 
98
  See above, section 1.2.1.  
99
  Some commentators correctly predicted as early as 1993 that ‘a risk exists that the appeal procedure will 
be not an extraordinary remedy, but the normal procedure to definitively resolve the dispute’. See M. 
Mora, ‘A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes’ 
(1993) 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 151. They were correct. Contra: R. Hudec, ‘The 
New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the Three First Years’ (1999) 8 Minnesota 
Journal of Global Trade 1, 28, who wrote in 1999: ‘as most observers expected, all but a handful adverse 
panel rulings have been appealed to the Appellate Body.’ (emphasis added). 
100
  This is the case in 86 per cent of all disputes that come before a panel. See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/violationcount.asp, visited on 7 January 2005. 
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findings of inconsistency, the respondent will have, at least, delayed the amendment of the 
legislation or trade measures concerned. The respondent will also be able to contend – to the 
domestic constituency – that it has exhausted all legal means available to it to ‘defend’ the 
legislation or trade measures concerned. 
 
Not only were many appeals filed, also many WTO Members were in some capacity involved 
in appellate review proceedings. From 1996 to 2004, 17 Members, of which 11 developing 
country Members, have been an appellant in one or more appeals.
101
 The most active user of 
the appellate review mechanism has been the United States. The United States has been the 
appellant in 21 appeals, i.e., 31 per cent of all appeals.
102
 On a distant second and third place 
come the European Communities and Canada, who have been appellants in respectively 9 and 
8 appeals, i.e., 13 and 12 per cent of all appeals.
103
 Brazil and India have each been an 
appellant in 5 appeals. Note also that in about half of all appeals, after an appeal was initiated 
by one of the parties, other parties also appealed the panel report at issue.
104
  16 Members have 
been such ‘other appellants’, of which 6 Members have never been original appellants.
105
 The 
United States has not only been the most active appellant, it has also been the most frequent 
appellee, again followed by the European Communities and Canada.
106
 In total, 26 Members 
                                            
101
  From 1996 to 2004, the following Members filed one or more notices of appeal: United States, European 
Communities, Canada, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Argentina, 
Turkey, Guatemala, Australia, the Philippines and Costa Rica. Most of these Members were an appellant 
only once. 
102
  This number does not include the notices of appeal which the United States withdrew and later re-filed. 
See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/appealnotices.asp?f1001=&f1002=&f1003=&f1004=&datefi
eldstart=&datefieldstarty=0&datefieldstartm=0&datefieldstartd=0&datefieldend=&datefieldendy=0&dat
efieldendm=0&datefieldendd=0&backlink=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.worldtradelaw.net%2Fdsc%2Fstats.
htm&form1_btn5=Search&id=&form1_mode=1, visited on 7 January 2005. Note that the United States 
was a complainant in 26 of the 106 panel reports, i.e., 24 per cent of all panel reports. 
103
  See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/appealnotices.asp?f1001=&f1002=European+Communities&
f1003=&f1004=&datefieldstart=&datefieldstarty=0&datefieldstartm=0&datefieldstartd=0&datefieldend
=&datefieldendy=0&datefieldendm=0&datefieldendd=0&backlink=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.worldtradel
aw.net%2Fdsc%2Fstats.htm&form1_btn5=Search&id=&form1_mode=1, visited on 7 January 2005. 
Note that the European Communities was a complainant in 25 of the 106 panel reports, i.e., 24 per cent 
of all panel reports. 
104
  This was the case in 31 of the 64 appeals in which an Appellate Body report was circulated in the period 
from 1996 to 2004. See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/partiesab.asp. visited on 7 January 
2005. See also Rule 23 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. 
105
  The United States, the European Communities, Japan, Brazil, India, Canada, Mexico, Korea, Argentina, 
Australia, China, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Honduras and Ecuador. The Members that have 
never been original appellants are indicated in italics. See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/partiesab.asp?f1001=&f1002=&f1003=&f1004=&f1005=&f
1006=&form1_btn5=Search&id=&form1_mode=1, visited on 7 January 2005. 
106
  The United States was an appellee in 38 appeal proceedings, the European Communities in 25 and 
Canada in 14. See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abreports.asp, visited on 16 January 2005. 
Among the developing country Members, Brazil (7) and India (5) were the most frequent appellees. 
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were at least once an appellee in appellate review proceedings.
107
 This group includes both 
developed and developing countries. Between 1996 and 2004, a total of 50 Members were 
third participants in appellate review proceedings.
108
 Participation as a third participant is a 
useful experience, especially for developing country Members, to gain a better understanding 
of proceedings which are otherwise confidential and take place behind closed doors.
109
 In total, 
over 30 per cent of the WTO Membership have been involved, as appellants, other appellants, 
appellees and/or third partipants in appellate review proceedings. 
 
Between 1996 and 2004, provisions of 13 of the 18 covered agreements have been the subject 
of findings of the Appellate Body.
110
 The provisions of the DSU and the GATT 1994 have 
been most frequently the subject of Appellate Body findings. The Appellate Body made 
findings on provisions of the DSU and the GATT 1994 in respectively 36 and 34 of its 64 
reports. The provisions of the SCM Agreement and the Anti-Dumping Agreement were at issue 
in respectively 13 and 12 Appellate Body reports. In fact, only a few WTO agreements of 
lesser importance have not been subject to findings of the Appellate Body.
111
 
 
 
                                            
107
  Argentina, United States, Canada, India, Japan, Brazil, China, European Communities, Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Chile, Indonesia Venezuela, Mexico, Thailand, Peru, Pakistan, 
Poland, Malaysia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and the Philippines. See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abreports.asp, visited on 16 January 2005. 
108
  Chinese Taipei, European Communities, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Australia, China, India, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Venezuela, Chile, Senegal, Suriname, Norway, New 
Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, Hong Kong, Israel, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Nigeria, Belize, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ghana, 
Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. See http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/partiesab.asp, 
visited on 16 January 2005. 
109
  To facilitate the involvement of developing country Members, the Appellate Body applied as from 1999 
until 2002 its own rules concerning participation in the oral hearing, in a flexible manner, by allowing 
third participants to attend the oral hearing even though they had not filed a third participant’s 
submission. In 2002, the Appellate Body amended its Working Procedures to allow participation in the 
oral hearings without the need to file a third participant’s submission. 
110
  See 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abreports.asp?f1001=&f1002=&f1003=&f1004=&f1005=&d
atefieldstart1=&datefieldstart1y=0&datefieldstart1m=0&datefieldstart1d=0&datefieldend1=&datefielden
d1y=0&datefieldend1m=0&datefieldend1d=0&datefieldstart2=&datefieldstart2y=0&datefieldstart2m=0
&datefieldstart2d=0&datefieldend2=&datefieldend2y=0&datefieldend2m=0&datefieldend2d=0&f1010=
&f1011=&backlink=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.worldtradelaw.net%2Fdsc%2Fstats.htm&form1_btn5=Sear
ch&id=&form1_mode=1, visited on 7 January 2005. 
111
  These WTO agreements are the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the Customs Valuation Agreement, the 
Agreement on Government Procurement, the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection and the TRIMS 
Agreement. 
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In summary, the Appellate Body has been in all respects very active. The number of appeals 
has been, both in absolute and relative terms, quite significant. The Appellate Body has heard 
appeals initiated by a fairly broad section of the WTO Membership, including both developed 
and developing country Members. One third of all WTO Members has at least once been 
involved, in some capacity, in appellate review proceedings. The provisions of most WTO 
agreements have been the subject of Appellate Body findings. Without this degree of activity, 
the Appellate Body obviously would not have been able to contribute to the development of 
international trade law to the extent that it did nor would it have been so ‘familiar’ to so many 
Members. 
 
3.5 Use made of the authority of appellate review 
 
A fifth factor that has contributed to the rise in prominence of the Appellate Body has been the 
manner in which the Appellate Body has used its authority of appellate review. As discussed 
above, the Appellate Body has, pursuant Article 17.13 of the DSU, the authority ‘to uphold, 
modify or reverse’ legal findings and conclusions of a panel. In its 64 reports issued between 
1996 and 2004, the Appellate Body made in total 414 different rulings. In 349 of these rulings 
(84%), the Appellate Body upheld, modified or reversed legal findings of panels.
112
 In the 
                                            
112
  In many instances the Appellate Body upheld or reversed findings of panels without using the very words 
“to uphold” or “to reverse”. In these cases the Appellate Body usually stated that “the Panel did not fail 
to…”, “the Panel did not err in its finding…” (upholding) or, on the contrary, that “the Panel failed 
to…”, “the Panel erred in its finding…” (reversal). 
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remaining 65 rulings (16%), the Appellate Body took an action not explicitly provided for in 
Article 17.13 of the DSU. 
 
Of the findings either upheld, modified or reversed, 66 per cent was upheld, 31 per cent was 
reversed and 3 per cent was modified. The share of the findings that was upheld by the 
Appellate Body is thus quite significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is an indication of the good work done by panels. However, these data, and in particular, 
the data relating to the number panel findings upheld and modified, are to some extent 
misleading. Close reading of the rulings of the Appellate Body in which it upheld panel 
findings, reveals that in many instances the Appellate Body in fact did not agree with the 
reasoning of the panel and substituted its own reasoning for that of the panel. In a number of 
these instances, it would have been more correct for the Appellate Body to state that it 
modified the panel’s finding under appeal. On the other hand, by ‘upholding’ such a finding 
rather than ‘modifying’ it, the Appellate Body strengthens the authority of panels, which is 
beneficial for the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole.  
 
Especially in the early days of the Appellate Body, some observers argued that the Appellate 
Body was needlessly ‘harsh’ on panels. An example of such alleged ‘harshness’ was the rebuke 
in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses that the panel’s reasoning on one of the issues in that case – 
namely the burden of proof – was not ‘a model of clarity’.
113
 In later reports, the Appellate 
Body refrained from such sarcastic comments. In general, the tone of the Appellate Body 
                                            
113
  Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, DSR 1997:I, p. 334. 
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reports of the first few years was often described as ‘schoolmasterish’. While intended as a 
criticism, the then Appellate Body Members may not have seen it that way. It is clear from 
those reports that they considered it useful to explain their conclusions in a very careful and 
‘pedagogic’ manner. With the years, the Appellate Body reports have become more technical 
and somewhat less accessible for a non-specialist, although when compared with panel reports 
they are still a ‘joy’ to read.  Even when the Appellate Body agrees with the Panel, it still 
wields a very sharp knife and often finds it useful to make the effort to say the same in a 
different, and hopefully, more comprehensible manner. The Appellate Body has been criticized 
for doing this, but wrongly so. An important reason for the ‘success’ of its case law is that 
Members often found the reasoning in Appellate Body reports quite clear. 
 
As stated above, in 65, or 16 per cent, of its 414 rulings, the Appellate Body took an action 
other than upholding, modifying or reversing an appealed panel finding, i.e., the three types of 
action explicitly provided for in Article 17.13 of the DSU.  This ‘other action’ took various 
forms, including: (1) making findings on issues on which the panel had not made findings (i.e., 
completing the legal analysis); (2) declining to complete the legal analysis; (3) ruling on the 
scope of the appellate review; (4) ruling on procedural issues; and (5) declining to rule on moot 
issues. 
 
In a number of appeals, the Appellate Body found itself compelled to rule on the scope of the 
appellate review or on procedural issues. While WTO Members may not always have agreed 
with the Appellate Body’s rulings on these matters in specific cases, they did not challenge the 
Appellate Body’s competence to take ‘other action’ in these forms.
114
 This competence was 
correctly considered to be inherent in the explicit competence to uphold, modify or reverse the 
panel findings appealed. Also the Appellate Body’s competence to decline to rule on moot 
issues was not contested. Article 17.12 of the DSU states that the Appellate Body must address 
each of the issues raised in an appeal, but the Appellate Body has always given this obligation 
a flexible and pragmatic interpretation.  
The most surprising form of this ‘other action’ by the Appellate Body is undoubtedly the 
making of findings on issues on which the panel had not made findings, an action usually 
referred to as ‘completing the legal analysis’. A complainant often makes claims of violation of 
multiple provisions of WTO law with regard to the measure at issue. After the panel has found 
                                            
114
  Note that this is not the case for the Appellate Body’s rulings on the amicus curiae issue but this issue 
was not considered to be a procedural issue by most Members. 
 30
a violation of one or some of these provisions, the panel may decide, for reasons of judicial 
economy, not to make findings with respect to the claims of violation of other provisions. 
However, if the panel report is appealed and the Appellate Body reverses the panel’s findings 
of violation, the question arises as to what the Appellate Body can do with regard to the claims 
of violation which the panel, in its exercise of judicial economy, did not address. A similar 
question arises in cases in which a panel concludes that a provision or provisions of WTO law 
(e.g. the TBT Agreement) is not applicable in the case at hand but in which, on appeal of this 
finding of inapplicability, the Appellate Body comes to the opposite conclusion. In many other 
judicial systems, the appeals court would in similar situations ‘remand’ the case to the first 
instance judge. However, the DSU does not provide for the possibility of ‘remand’ to panels. 
In the absence of a remand authority, the Appellate Body is left with two options: 
• either to leave the dispute unresolved, or 
• to go on to ‘complete the legal analysis’. 
 
In Canada – Periodicals, the Appellate Body stated that “the Appellate Body can, and should, 
complete the analysis of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 in this case by examining the measure 
with reference to its consistency with the second sentence of Article III:2, provided that there is a 
sufficient basis in the Panel Report to allow us to do so.’
115
 (emphasis added) In the 
circumstances of that case, the Appellate Body considered that it would be ‘remiss in not 
completing the analysis of Article III:2’.
116
 However, the Appellate Body has ‘completed the 
legal analysis’ only in cases in which there were sufficient factual findings in the panel report 
or undisputed facts in the panel record to enable it to carry out the legal analysis.
117
 In practice, 
the Appellate Body has often found it impossible to ‘complete the legal analysis’ due to 
insufficient factual findings in the panel report or a lack of undisputed facts in the panel record. 
In addition, the Appellate Body has also declined to complete the legal analysis because of the 
novel character of the claims which the Panel did not address. Claims are ‘novel’ when they 
concern issues which have not yet been dealt with in the WTO case law. In EC – Asbestos, the 
Appellate Body stated that ‘in light of their novel character, we consider that Canada's claims 
under the TBT Agreement have not been explored before us in depth. As the Panel did not 
address these claims, there are no “issues of law” or “legal interpretations” regarding them to 
be analyzed by the parties, and reviewed by us under Article 17.6 of the DSU. We also observe 
                                            
115
  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Periodicals, 469. 
116
  Ibid. 
117
  Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 118. 
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that the sufficiency of the facts on the record depends on the reach of the provisions of the TBT 
Agreement claimed to apply – a reach that has yet to be determined.’
118
   
 
Some authors have strongly argued against the practice of ‘completing the legal analysis’. First 
of all it is difficult to argue that this practice is within the mandate of Article 17.13 of the DSU 
to uphold, modify of reverse panel findings, as there are no findings by the panel. Second, by 
dealing with an issue not dealt with by a panel, the Appellate Body deprives parties of their 
right of appeal provided for in the DSU.
119
. Other authors have defended the Appellate Body’s 
practice of ‘completing of the legal analysis’ and have argued that in cases such a US – Shrimp 
and EC – Hormones this practice has contributed to the credibility of the WTO dispute 
settlement system.
120
 It is argued that, until the DSU is amended to address the problem of the 
absence of remand power, the Appellate Body’s practice of completing the legal analysis is 
preferred to leaving disputes unresolved.
121
 The Appellate Body had to make, and has made, a 
choice for the lesser of two evils. 
 
While the Appellate Body has in a number of instances been willing to complete the legal 
analysis and act as a first instance court, in many other instances the Appellate Body has shown 
great restraint not to go further than needed in the particular case. The Appellate Body has 
made a significant, albeit not always successful, effort to avoid ‘obiter dicta’. In fact, it has 
occasionally been criticized for not ‘taking the extra step’ to clarify the law and thus perhaps 
avoid related disputes in the future. The Appellate Body was, and is, well advised to show such 
restraint.
122
  
 
A final observation with respect to the manner in which the Appellate Body has made use of its 
authority of appellate review relates to the fact that in only two reports to date an Appellate 
Body Member made use of the possibility, provided for in Article 17.11 of the DSU, to express 
                                            
118
  Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 82. 
119
  See, e.g., J. Bourgeois, ‘Some Reflections on the WTO Dispute Settlement System from a Practitioner’s 
Perspective’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law, 152;  and E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis and 
P. Waer, ‘The Functioning of the Appellate Body after Four Years: Towards Rule Integrity’ (1999) 33 
Journal of World Trade, 6-7. 
120
  See, e.g., Viji Rangaswami, ‘Operation of the Appellate Process and Functions, Including the Appellate 
Body’ (2000) 31 Law and Policy in International Business, 704. 
121
  Ibid. 
122
  The Appellate Body has of course not always shown restraint. In EC – Asbestos, for example, it could 
have chosen not to rule on the Panel’s findings on Article XX of the GATT 1994 after it had reserved the 
Panel’s finding of inconsistency with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. As the Appellate Body found that 
the measure at issue in EC – Asbestos was not GATT-inconsistent, there was no real need to review the 
Panel’s findings on the justification under Article XX of the measure at issue. Nevertheless, the 
Appellate Body did take this opportunity to further clarify Article XX. See Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Asbestos, paras. 155-175. 
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an individual opinion in the report. The report in EC – Asbestos (with a separate opinion 
reflecting a fundamental difference in opinion on a central issue in that case) as well as the 
very recent report in US - Cotton are thus far the only reports  in which the three Members of 
the division were unable to show a united front.  There have undoubtedly been other cases in 
which not all three Members were in full agreement with the reasoning in the report, but the 
Appellate Body manifestly realized that (frequent) recourse to separate opinions would 
undermine the authority of its case law. 
 
3.6 Case law of the Appellate Body  
 
The last but arguably most important factor in the rise to prominence of the Appellate Body 
has been its case law, and in particular the case law balancing free trade and other societal 
values and interests and the case law ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
 
In general, the case law of the Appellate Body carefully balances free trade with other societal 
values, such as public health, the environment, or consumer protection. This balance is of 
course primarily set out in numerous provisions of the WTO agreements but the Appellate 
Body has clarified this delicate balance and applied it in specific cases.  Over the last nine 
years, the Appellate Body has not been the ‘champion’ of free trade. True to the common 
intentions of the WTO Members, the Appellate Body – when called upon to interpret and apply 
provisions of, for example, the GATT 1994, the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement – 
balances free trade with other societal values and interests and leaves Members the largest 
degree of discretion possible to take measures for the protection and promotion of these 
societal values and interests.  An excellent example of this is the Appellate Body’s approach to 
the General Exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994.  While it could be argued that it is an 
accepted principle of interpretation that exceptions are to be construed narrowly (singularia 
non sunt extendenda) and that Article XX should, therefore, be construed narrowly, the 
Appellate Body has not adopted this approach. Instead, it has advocated in US – Gasoline and 
US – Shrimp a kind of balancing between the general rule and the exception. It stated, with 
regard to Article XX(g), the exception at issue in these cases: 
 
The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the rest of the General 
Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III and XI;  conversely, the context of 
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Articles I and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the phrase “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” may not be read so expansively 
as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 
be given so broad a reach as effectively to emasculate Article XX(g) and the 
policies and interests it embodies. The relationship between the affirmative 
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests 
embodied in the “General Exceptions” listed in Article XX, can be given meaning 
within the framework of the General Agreement and its object and purpose by a 
treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by careful scrutiny of the factual and 
legal context in a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually used by the 
WTO Members themselves to express their intent and purpose.
123
 
 
Clearly, therefore, the Appellate Body considers a narrow interpretation of the exceptions of 
Article XX, i.e., the exceptions allowing for, inter alia, trade-restrictive measures to protect 
public health or the environment to be inappropriate. The Appellate Body advocates a balance 
between trade liberalisation and other societal values. With respect to the interpretation and 
application of the all-important chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body 
ruled in US – Shrimp: 
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the 
delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of 
a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other 
Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the 
GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and 
thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations 
constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the 
line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the 
line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts 
making up specific cases differ.
124
  
In short, the interpretation and application of the chapeau in a particular case is a search for the 
appropriate line of equilibrium between the right of Members to adopt and maintain trade-
restrictive legislation and measures that pursue certain legitimate societal values or interests 
and the right of other Members to trade. 
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In a number of reports, the Appellate Body has explained, in straightforward language, the 
scope for Members to enact trade-restrictive legislation and measures that pursue certain 
legitimate societal values or interests.  In US – Shrimp, for example, the Appellate Body 
concluded with the following observation: 
 
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in 
this appeal.  We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the 
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We 
have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot 
adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. 
Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states 
should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the 
WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise 
protect the environment.  Clearly, they should and do.  
What we have decided in this appeal is simply this:  although the measure of the 
United States in dispute in this appeal serves an environmental objective that is 
recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
this measure has been applied by the United States in a manner which constitutes 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO, contrary 
to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. For all of the specific reasons 
outlined in this Report, this measure does not qualify for the exemption that 
Article XX of the GATT 1994 affords to measures which serve certain 
recognized, legitimate environmental purposes but which, at the same time, are 
not applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.  As we emphasized in United States – Gasoline, 
WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at protecting the 
environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their obligations and respect the 
rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.
125
 
 
Over the years, the Appellate Body has shown itself to be quite balanced in its approach to the 
inevitable conflicts between trade liberalisation and other societal values and interests. Directly 
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linked to this the Appellate Body has also been rather respectful of the sovereignty of WTO 
Members and their right to pursue the protection and promotion of these other values ad 
interests. In 1995, Richard Shell wrote that ‘it … seems likely that when domestic political 
realities make it difficult or impossible for the leading states in the world trade system to take 
the risk of championing a particular free trade reform, the WTO Appellate Body may step into 
the role of an advocate for the free trade agenda’.
126
 This did not happen. The Appellate Body 
never was, and also currently is not, a ‘devotee’ of the free trade cause. As is reflected in its 
case law, the Appellate Body is a promoter of the balance between free trade and other societal 
values set out in the WTO agreements. The eminent status of the Appellate Body and its case 
law is to a large extent due to the fact that the Appellate Body has struck this balance correctly 
or is generally seen as genuinely trying to strike the correct balance. 
 
Finally, the Appellate Body also gained significant stature as a result of its case law ensuring 
the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system. The agreement on the 
rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement reached by the Uruguay Round negotiators 
and reflected in the DSU was undoubtedly a very significant achievement. However, when the 
WTO dispute settlement system was put in operation, it soon became clear that there were 
important gaps in the rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement. As from the first 
disputes brought to Geneva for resolution onwards, panels and the Appellate Body confronted 
with these gaps in the system. The rulings of the Appellate Body on issues such as burden of 
proof, judicial economy, the use of experts, the submission and admission of evidence, 
standard of review, terms of reference, (extended) third party rights, good faith in dispute 
settlement proceedings, and representation by private counsel, have made an important 
contribution to the fair and effective functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system. These 
rulings have ‘completed’ the dispute settlement system and have made it into the system as we 
now know it.  
 
An excellent example of this are the rulings of the Appellate Body on representation by private 
counsel in Appellate Body hearings and panel meetings. The DSU does not address the issue of 
representation of the parties before the Appellate Body or panels. In EC – Bananas III, the 
issue arose whether private counsel, not employed by government, may represent a party or 
third party (such as Saint Lucia) before the Appellate Body. In its ruling, the Appellate Body 
noted that nothing in the WTO Agreement or the DSU, nor in customary international law or 
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the prevailing practice of international tribunals, prevents a WTO Member from determining 
for itself the composition of its delegation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
127
 A party 
can, therefore, decide that private counsel forms part of its delegation and will represent it in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. While the ruling of the Appellate Body concerned the 
proceedings before this body, the reasoning of this ruling is equally relevant for panel 
proceedings. This was confirmed in the Panel Report in Indonesia – Autos, adopted one year 
after the Appellate Body Report in EC – Bananas III.
128
 Private counsel now routinely appear 
in panel as well as Appellate Body proceedings as part of the delegation of a party or third 
party. As the Appellate Body noted in EC – Bananas III ‘representation by counsel of a 
government's own choice may well be a matter of particular significance -- especially for 
developing country Members -- to enable them to participate fully in dispute settlement 
proceedings.’
129
  
 
Another, perhaps less well-known example of Appellate Body case law that contributed to the 
fairness and effectiveness of the dispute settlement system, is its ruling in US – FSC on the 
obligation in Article 3.10 to use the dispute settlement system in good faith. Generally 
speaking, the parties to a dispute enjoy a high degree of discretion to argue before panels in the 
manner they deem appropriate. The Appellate Body ruled, however, that this discretion, 
however, does not detract from the parties’ obligation under the DSU to engage in dispute 
settlement proceedings ‘in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute’.
130
 Both complaining 
and responding parties must comply with the requirements of the DSU in good faith. In US – 
FSC, the Appellate Body held: 
 
By good faith compliance, complaining Members accord to the responding 
Members the full measure of protection and opportunity to defend, contemplated 
by the letter and spirit of the procedural rules. The same principle of good faith 
requires that responding Members seasonably and promptly bring claimed 
procedural deficiencies to the attention of the complaining Member, and to the 
DSB or the Panel, so that corrections, if needed, can be made to resolve disputes. 
The procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the 
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development of litigation techniques, but simply the fair, prompt and effective 
resolution of trade disputes.
131
 
 
WTO Members have of course not all or always agreed with the Appellate Body’s rulings on 
‘procedural’ matters in particular cases. However, with the obvious exception of the rulings on 
the issue of amicus curiae briefs, this case law has found general acceptance. WTO Members 
appreciate the importance of the contribution of this case law to the proper functioning of the 
WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The Appellate Body was not conceived by the Uruguay Round negotiators as the centerpiece 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. It was more an afterthought, linked to the introduction 
of the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports under the new dispute settlement system. In 
little time, however, the Appellate Body grew into the most important and authoritative organ 
of WTO dispute settlement. The Appellate Body is now, in all but name, the World Trade 
Court. The significance of its contribution to the development of international trade law is 
generally recognized. The factors that have contributed to its rise to prominence over the last 
decade are multiple and often closely related. They include the first and subsequent 
compositions of the Appellate Body; the Working Procedures for Appellate Review; the early 
embracement and consistent application of the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention; the frequent and broad recourse to appellate review; the manner in which the 
Appellate Body used its authority of appellate review; and, finally, the case law of the 
Appellate Body to date, and in particular the case law balancing free trade and other societal 
values and the case law ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. It is important to identify and correctly appreciate these factors because the Appellate 
Body will retain its current status and role in the world trading system only to the extent that 
these factors continue to be sufficiently present. 
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